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Abstract
Numerous studies have reported subliminal repetition and semantic priming in the visual modality. We transferred this
paradigm to the auditory modality. Prime awareness was manipulated by a reduction of sound intensity level.
Uncategorized prime words (according to a post-test) were followed by semantically related, unrelated, or repeated target
words (presented without intensity reduction) and participants performed a lexical decision task (LDT). Participants with
slower reaction times in the LDT showed semantic priming (faster reaction times for semantically related compared to
unrelated targets) and negative repetition priming (slower reaction times for repeated compared to semantically related
targets). This is the first report of semantic priming in the auditory modality without conscious categorization of the prime.
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Introduction
The extent to which words can be processed unconsciously
has been a topic of considerable debate. Unlike studies of
implicit word processing [1], studies of subliminal word
processing are rather rare. This might be due to the complex
questions this research domain has to face: in particular, how to
demonstrate the absence of consciousness and how to measure
unconscious effects [2,3]. In the visual modality, a method for
studying subliminal processing consists in the presentation of
stimuli in a subliminal priming paradigm: the prime word is
presented for a short time (usually less than 50 ms) and is
surrounded by a forward and/or a backward visual mask
[4,5,6]. In these conditions, visual orthographic and morpho-
logical priming have been observed [5,7]. Other studies have
shown phonological and semantic effects with this paradigm [8–
14], but some of them have received severe criticisms, notably
because no index of prime awareness was provided (see [15,16]
for reviews).
In the auditory modality, subliminal perception has been
considerably less investigated. Similarly to the visual modality,
masking techniques (e.g., white noise) have been used to reduce
prime awareness. However, most of these studies reported
contradictory results [17], allowing no clear conclusions. More
recently, by transferring the visual subliminal priming paradigm
to the auditory domain, i.e. by using masked and time-
compressed primes, Kouider and Dupoux [18] reported sublim-
inal repetition priming for speech, but no subliminal semantic
priming.
Studying auditory subliminal priming requires adaptations of
the experimental design because of the sequential nature of
speech presentation and because of longer processing times in the
auditory compared to the visual domain. Unlike visual words,
which can be fully presented in a short time window (without
distortion), spoken words require time for presentation/pronun-
ciation. In addition, processing is lengthened in the auditory
domain as compared to the visual domain [19,20], notably
because of the greater number of relays in the ascending auditory
pathway. This domain specificity suggests that in an auditory
subliminal priming experiment, primes may not be fully
perceived before the participants’ response when (a) participants
are asked to perform a task as fast as possible, (b) the duration
between primes and targets is very short, and (c) primes are
difficult to perceive. Hence, if a participant responds rather fast,
priming might be attenuated because of an incomplete processing
of the prime. This is in line with Wundt’s [21] early prediction
that auditory priming might be sensitive to participants’ response
speed and is consistent with more recent research [22–23]. For
instance, phonological or conceptual priming studies have
reported contextual facilitation for slow responders but not for
fast responders when prime processing required a long processing
time, either because of the auditory modality or because of the
task difficulty [24–27].
Here, we investigated auditory subliminal repetition and
semantic priming by using primes presented at low intensity, i.e.
in competition with the internal noise (i.e. the random variability
in participants’ neural responses to sensory stimuli [28,29]). We
took into account the specificity of the auditory domain by
contrasting fast- with slow-responders’ performance and we
predicted faster response-times (in a lexical decision task) to
semantically primed target words presented at low sound intensity
for the group of slow-responders.
After the priming experiment, a prime categorization test
(word/pseudo-word) was presented to check that participants were
unable to categorize the low-intensity primes. The prime
categorization was used as a measure of prime awareness, as in
previous studies [11–14,30], including those investigating the
auditory modality [18].
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Participants
Forty-five volunteers were tested: 16 in a pre-experiment (12
females, 22.160.4 years) and 29 others in the main experiment.
All participants were right-handed according to the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory [31], native French speakers, and did not
report any hearing problems or history of neurological disease. All
participants provided written informed consent to the study, which
was conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the
Declaration of Helsinki, and approved by the local Ethics
Committee (CPP Sud-Est II). Participants of the main experiment
had pure tone auditory thresholds below 15 dB-HL for frequen-
cies between 250 Hz to 8000 Hz [32]. In the main experiment, a
lexical decision task (LDT) on primed targets was followed by two
post-tests. Five participants were excluded from the main
experiment because of their poor LDT performance or because
their performance differed by more than two standard deviations
(SD) from the group performance of the post-tests (see details at
the end of the Procedure section). Thus, 24 participants (16
females, 21.560.3 years) were included in the analysis of the main
experiment.
Stimuli
One hundred and sixty words were selected from a French
database (Lexique 2, [33]). They were monosyllabic nouns of two
to seven letters and two to five phonemes (e.g., ‘‘sable’’ [sand],
‘‘vache’’ [cow]). All words had a frequency of occurrence higher
than one per million occurrences in books and in movies (subtitles).
A list of monosyllabic pseudo-words was created using all
phonemes of the words, the number of phonemes being matched
to the words. Pseudo-words could be pronounced, but were
meaningless (according to a pre-experiment). The average
durations of words and pseudo-words were 521 ms (SD=115 ms)
and 539 ms (SD=88 ms), respectively. To reduce differences in
the perceived loudness, all stimuli were equalized to reach the
same dB-A level (A-weighting roughly mimics the external and
middle ear transfer functions; [34]).
Words and pseudo-words were uttered by the same female
speaker and recorded at 32 bits and 44.1 kHz. The mean level of
presentation was calibrated with a standard artificial ear to reach
80 dB-A. A null (for primes and targets of the pre-experiment and
for targets of the main experiment) or moderate digital attenuation
(35 dB for primes of the main experiment) was combined with an
analog fixed attenuation. This attenuation was analog rather than
digital to prevent acoustic distortion at low levels of presentation.
All stimuli were binaurally presented to participants through
headphones.
Procedure
Pre-experiment. To check that repetition priming and
semantic priming were elicited with our experimental material, a
first group of participants heard a (prime) word, followed by a
(target) word or pseudo-word. Participants were asked to decide
whether the target was a word or a pseudo-word (i.e. performed a
LDT). Primes and targets were presented at a comfortable hearing
level (60 dB-A) to sixteen participants. They performed a LDT on
the target as fast and accurately as possible by pressing one of two
buttons. One hundred and twenty prime-target pairs were
presented in random order: sixty with a word target (20
semantically related to the prime (categorically or associatively
related), 20 semantically unrelated to the prime, and 20 repeated)
and sixty with a pseudo-word target. Across participants, words
were used as either semantically related, semantically unrelated, or
repeated. For each participant, none of the words was repeated,
except inside the pairs of the repeated condition. A fixation cross
was displayed in the center of a monitor screen while the prime
word was presented. The target was presented 50 ms after the end
of the prime (and of the fixation cross).
Main experiment. A second group of participants performed
first the LDT in a subliminal priming paradigm and then two post-
tests: a prime detection task and a prime categorization task.
The priming phase was the same as in the pre-experiment,
except for the sound level (prime: 10 dB-A; target: 45 dB-A) and
the instructions: participants were not told about the presence of
the prime. The 10 dB-A intensity level was chosen because
previous experiments by our team suggested an absence of
conscious categorization at this level (Signoret, Tillmann,
Gaudrain, Grimault, & Perrin. Facilitated auditory detection for
speech. Submitted).
Awareness of the prime was estimated with a prime categori-
zation post-test, as a standard measure of prime awareness (e.g.,
[18] in the auditory modality, and [13,30,35–37] in the visual
modality). A word (n=60) or a pseudo-word (n=60), was
randomly presented at 10 dB-A together with the fixation cross.
Participants were told to decide whether a word or a pseudo-word
was presented during the fixation cross and to give their response
as accurately as possible and as soon as the fixation cross had
disappeared. Participants were told that the task was difficult and
that they should not be discouraged by the difficulty. Fifty
milliseconds after the participant’s response, a second stimulus (a
word or a pseudo-word), for which no task was requested, was
presented at 45 dB-A to maintain the same intensity context as in
the priming phase [38]. None of the stimuli were repeated
between the two phases of the main experiment, but across
participants all stimuli presented in the priming phase were used in
the post-test.
Since our aim was to study subliminal auditory perception in a
homogenous participant group, participants had to be (1) able to
perform the LDT in the priming phase of the main experiment,
(2) unable to categorize the prime, but nevertheless (3) able to
detect it. To test for prime detection, participants performed a
detection task (present/absent) in which a word (n=60) or a
silence (n=60) was randomly presented at the same time as a
fixation cross. To avoid participants searching for words, this
prime detection task was performed before the prime categori-
zation task. Analysis of the prime detection task showed an
average accuracy of 87.461.7% and a d9 sensitivity (computed
according to the Signal Detection Theory (SDT), [39]) of
detection (d9D) of 2.760.1. Five participants were excluded from
the analysis of the main experiment because (1) their performance
at the LDT in the priming phase of the main experiment were
below the group’s mean accuracy minus two SD, or (2) their
performance at the prime categorization task were two SD above
the group mean d9 sensitivity of categorization (d9C) (close to zero,
i.e., chance level), or (3) their detection of the prime was two SD
below the group mean d9D. Priming is assumed to be subliminal
when the performance on the target is above zero, but the
performance on the prime is null (here at d9C=0) [41]. When
this is not the case (or for confirmation purposes), Greenwald,
Klinger, and Schuh [36] introduced a regression method that
allows investigating whether the priming is still reliable when the
performance on the prime is extrapolated to zero. Subliminal
priming would be shown when, the estimated priming at d9C=0
(corresponding to the y-intercept of the regression) is significantly
different from zero. d9C was computed for each participant.
Thus, the regression was based on a sample size equal to the
participant sample size.
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Accuracy and correct RTs were analyzed with ANOVAs using
Relatedness (3 levels: related, unrelated, and repeated word pairs)
as within-subject factor and Rapidity (slow responders/fast
responders) as between-subjects factor. Participants were separated
into slow and fast responders with a median split. All reported p-
values were adjusted with Greenhouse–Geisser correction for
nonsphericity when appropriate. Fisher’s Least Significant Differ-
ence test was applied for post-hoc comparisons as the Relatedness
factor had only three levels [40].
Pre-experiment
Average LDT accuracy was 96.260.7%. There was a main
effect of Relatedness [F(2,28)=6.90; p=.004; gp
2=.330] with
better accuracy for semantically related (98.760.6%) and
repeated word pairs (97.560.6%) than for unrelated pairs
(92.562.2%) (ps,.01). There was no main effect of Rapidity
(slow/fast) [p=.22] and no interaction with Relatedness
[p=.12]. For RTs (Figure 1), the effect of Relatedness was
also significant [F(2,28)=21.8; p,.001; gp
2=.609]: RTs were
faster for repeated targets (921638 ms) than for semantically
related (1005638 ms) (p=.003) and unrelated targets
(1092632 ms) (p,.001); RTs were also faster for semantically
related versus unrelated targets (p=.002). A main effect of
Rapidity [F(1,14)=28.8; p,.001; gp
2=.673] confirmed that
slow and fast responders’ RTs were significantly different. No
interaction between Rapidity and Relatedness was observed
[p=.67]. These results indicated that our material, when both
primes and targets were presented at a comfortable hearing level
(60 dB-A), elicited the expected semantic and repetition priming
effects.
Main experiment
In the priming phase, the overall LDT accuracy was high
(93.960.7%) and there was no significant effect of Relatedness nor
an interaction between Relatedness and Rapidity (ps..17). For
correct RTs (Figure 2), the interaction between Relatedness and
Rapidity (slow/fast) was significant [F(2,44)=3.54; p=.04;
gp
2=.139]. For slow responders only, RTs were smaller for
semantically related targets (1105629 ms) than for unrelated
(1153628 ms) (p=.034) and repeated targets (1166628 ms)
(p=.008). RTs did not differ between unrelated and repeated
targets (p=.549). For the fast responders, no significant differences
were observed (ps..470). In addition, a main effect of Rapidity
[F(1,22)=19.8; p,.001; gp
2=.474] confirmed that slow and fast
responders’ RTs were significantly different.
In the post-test prime categorization task, the average accuracy
was 52.061.2% (chance level: 50%) with d9C=.106.04 (slow
group: 51.661.6% with d9C=.086.05; fast group: 52.461.8%
with d9C=.126.06). The d9C was not significantly greater than
zero for the slow group [t(11)=1.58, p=.14] and the fast group
[t(11)=1.94, p=.08] and did not differ significantly between the
fast and slow groups [t(22)=.51, p=.61], thereby suggesting that
participants were unable to categorize the prime.
As categorization sensitivity for the entire group was slightly
greater than zero (d9C=.10604, t(22)=2.54, p=.02), priming at
d9C=0 was estimated through regression analyzes [41]. The
regression line of priming effects between related and unrelated
pairs was y=2120x+29 with a y-intercept that was significantly
above zero [t(22)=2.77, p=.010] (Figure 3). According to this
regression, at d9C=0, participants would respond 29 ms faster to
related pairs compared to unrelated pairs and this RT difference
would be significant (p=.010). The regression line of priming
effects between related and repeated pairs was y=280.2x+31.0
Figure 1. Correct Reaction Times at the lexical decision task – pre-experiment. Correct Reaction Times at the lexical decision task in the pre-
experiment with semantically unrelated, semantically related, and repeated word pairs in slow (N=12) and fast responders (N=12) (unit:
milliseconds; with SEM).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020273.g001
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lexical decision task in the priming phase of the main experiment with semantically unrelated, semantically related, and repeated word pairs in slow
(N=12) and fast responders (N=12) (unit: milliseconds; with SEM).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020273.g002
Figure 3. Regression line of the priming between related and unrelated pairs. Regression line of the priming between related and
unrelated pairs (vertical axis: correct reaction time difference between the two conditions in milliseconds) as a function of the prime awareness
sensitivity d9c (see Methods), on the horizontal axis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020273.g003
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p=.012] (Figure 4). According to this regression, at d9C=0,
participants would respond 31 ms faster to related pairs compared
to repeated pairs and this RT difference would be significant
(p=.012). As these estimated priming effects at d9C=0 (corre-
sponding to the y-intercepts) differed from zero, these regression
suggested semantic and negative repetition priming when
participants were not able to categorize the stimuli.
Discussion
By reducing the sound intensity of prime words, our study
suggests semantic speech priming in the absence of awareness (as
measured by a prime categorization task). Participants were faster
to discriminate target words that followed semantically related
words than target words that followed semantically unrelated
words. Moreover, they showed faster responses for semantically
related words than for repeated words (a negative repetition
priming). These two priming effects were particularly well
observed for slow responders.
Subliminal semantic priming in speech
Our study is the first study to report subliminal semantic
priming with auditory primes. In the visual domain, only a few
studies that properly controlled the level of prime awareness have
reported unconscious semantic priming effects [16]. Dell’Acqua
and Grainger [12] showed a 30-ms faster target word
categorization when the unconsciously perceived picture prime
belonged to the same semantic category (compared to a different
semantic category). They further replicated their findings with
target pictures and a picture-naming task, showing a 22-ms
unconscious facilitation in the semantically related condition.
Using visual word pairs and a LDT, Kiefer and Brendel [14]
reported unconscious semantic priming with RT differences of
about 30 ms (see Figure 5 in [14]) and with Event-Related
Potentials. Furthermore, with visual prime numbers and auditory
or visual target numbers, Kouider and Dehaene reported a
subliminal number priming [4]. They interpreted their results as
based on semantic or sensorimotor priming (for a discussion
about semantic and sensorimotor priming interpretations, see
[15]).
Interestingly, the size of the auditory semantic priming effect we
report here (48 ms) is larger than what has been observed in these
studies. This difference might be due to the modality. At least
under conscious perception, larger semantic priming can be found
in the auditory modality than in the visual modality [19]. This
difference might be further explained by a difference in the
procedure for prime awareness reduction. In two of these prior
studies [12,14], the visual prime was presented briefly between a
forward and a backward mask. Although the visual prime was not
physically degraded, the presentation of these two masks in close
temporal conjunction might have resulted in a single percept of a
degraded prime [41]. Possibly, a physical or perceptual degrada-
tion of the prime might reduce the activation of its representation
in the mental lexicon and yield weaker priming. In contrast, the
primes of our present study were neither degraded physically nor
at a perceptual level (the only degradation might have resulted
from the internal noise of the perceiver).
In the auditory modality, subliminal semantic priming has never
been reported up to now. The absence of semantic priming in
Kouider and Dupoux [18] might be explained by the fact that they
used time-compressed and masked primes and/or that they did
not analyze their results separately for slow and fast responders. It
is possible that unconscious semantic priming was present in their
study, but was reduced by the time distortion of the prime. Indeed,
Beattie [42] has shown a decrease of intelligibility with 60% time-
compressed speech, suggesting impaired semantic analyzes.
Furthermore, as everyday life speech perception usually does not
require the perception of time-compressed words, it is likely that
stimuli of this type have a poor representation in the mental
Figure 4. Regression line of the priming between related and repeated pairs. Regression line of the priming between related and repeated
pairs (correct reaction time difference between the two conditions in milliseconds) as function of the prime awareness sensitivity d9c (see Methods),
on the horizontal axis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020273.g004
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semantic priming.
Subliminal repetition priming in speech
Participants responded faster to target words that followed
semantically related prime words than to target words that
repeated the prime, an effect referred to as negative priming [43].
This priming was comparable to an effect reported for compatible
trials [44], notably when the awareness of the prime was reduced
[45]. In our study, the negative priming effect was observed for
repeated words when the awareness of the prime was reduced,
whereas under awareness (in our pre-experiment), the same
experimental material showed the classical repetition effect (with
strongest facilitation for repeated targets, see [46] for a review).
One explanation of negative repetition priming is that inhibitory
mechanisms might affect RTs. Eimer and Schlaghecken [44]
proposed inhibitory mechanisms to account for this ‘‘negative
compatibility effect’’ (or ‘‘inverse priming’’) that had been
observed for repeated pairs of visual arrows. The negative
compatibility effect has been replicated several times and would
occur at the perceptual processing stage, i.e., before response
decision [47]. The reason for the emergence of this inhibitory
mechanism is still being debated [48,49]. One possible explanation
is based on the influence of a backward mechanism [50].
According to Kahan’s Retrospective Prime Clarification theory,
an inhibitory mechanism could result from a memory retrieval
process that compares the activated (semantic, orthographic, and
phonological) representations of the target with the memory trace
of the prime [50]. Both ‘‘forward’’ semantic priming (i.e. when the
semantic processing of the prime influences the perception of the
target) and ‘‘backward’’ semantic priming (i.e. when the semantic
perception of the target influences the processing of the prime)
must be taken into account in the present study. While ‘‘forward’’
semantic priming reflects facilitatory mechanisms, as shown by
positive priming, ‘‘backward’’ semantic priming often leads to a
negative priming that reflects inhibitory mechanisms [51].
Repetition priming would arise from the combined effects of
positive forward priming (or facilitation) and negative backward
priming (or inhibition). In our study, this negative backward
priming was likely to occur during both the pre-experiment (i.e.,
when the prime and the target were presented supraliminally)
and during the main experiment (i.e., when primes were
presented subliminally and targets supraliminally) because
backward priming requires the perception of the target, which
was presented supraliminally in these two experiments. What was
likely to change the most between the pre-experiment and the
main experiment is the strength of the positive forward priming,
which requires the perception of the prime. If the positive
(forward) priming is stronger than the negative (backward)
priming, as suggested by the overall positive priming in the
pre-experiment when neither the forward nor the backward
priming were attenuated (thanks to the supraliminal presenta-
tion), the overall negative priming observed in the main
experiment suggests that the positive (forward) priming was
attenuated (the prime perception being subliminal) while the
negative (backward) priming remained strong (the target
perception being supraliminal).
The lack of RTs difference between unrelated and repeated
targets (see Figure 2) would thus result from the positive (forward)
priming (between the repeated words) being canceled out by the
negative (backward) priming.
In contrast to the negative repetition priming observed here,
Kouider and Dupoux [18] have shown positive repetition priming.
Possibly, the above-mentioned inhibitory mechanisms, which
explain negative repetition priming, were attenuated in their
study because of stronger physical (acoustic) differences between
the target and the prime as compared to our study. Indeed, these
authors used a different procedure to reduce prime awareness.
While they time-compressed the prime and surrounded the prime
with masks, we did not degrade the prime, but instead presented
the prime at a low intensity level (where only degradation due to
participants’ internal noise may have occurred). Provided that the
negative (backward) repetition priming is highly sensitive to
physical differences between the target and the prime, this priming
might have been more attenuated in their study compared to ours.
In addition, since the prime awareness was larger in Kouider and
Dupoux’s study (with a d9’ of 0.21 and of 0.24 in their two
subliminal conditions) compared to our study (with a d9’=0.10 in
our subliminal condition, thus two-times smaller) the positive
(forward) priming might have been less attenuated in their study
than in ours. Since, the negative repetition priming could be
smaller and the positive repetition priming stronger in Kouider
and Dupoux’s study compared to our study, the addition of the
negative and positive repetition priming (i.e., the overall repetition
priming) could be positive in their study and negative in ours.
Rapidity effect
Even though regression analyzes suggest subliminal priming in
all our participants, the RT data showed these effects only in the
group of slow responders. This could be a confirmation of our
prediction that a differential facilitation between fast- and slow-
reacting participants would occur because the processing time of
the subliminally presented primes would be lengthy and difficult.
Slow responders took more time than fast responders to achieve
matching processes between the prime and the target [31]. Within
the model of parallel contingent processing of Milner [52], fast-
responders would only transmit partial stimulus-evaluation to the
response-preparation process [53–58] while slow-responders
would wait for a more complete stimulus evaluation before
response preparation.
In contrast, when participants were aware of the prime, priming
did not differ between slow and fast responders. These results
suggest that participants need more time and cognitive load to
process the prime when it is presented subliminally as compared to
when it is presented supraliminally.
Measures of awareness
As done by Kouider and Dupoux [18] in the auditory domain
and other researchers in the visual domain [11–14,30], we
controlled the awareness of the prime with a categorization task.
In our study, and probably in previous studies using categorization
as the measure of awareness, priming effects are observed while
primes are still detected (i.e., visible or audible). The definition of
the best measure of awareness is still a matter of debate. According
to Merikle and Reingold [59], a valid measure should meet the
criteria of being exhaustive (i.e., sensitive to conscious experience
so that no residual conscious perception goes unmeasured) and
exclusive (i.e., representing only conscious perception rather than
a combination of conscious and unconscious perception). While it
seems difficult to meet the exclusiveness criterion (see [3]), the
criterion of exhaustivity appears to be within reach. A measure of
awareness based on detection tasks (i.e., asking for the presence or
absence of the stimulus) is known for its greater sensitivity
compared to a measure of awareness based on discrimination
tasks. According to Snodgrass and colleagues [60], the detection
task would be the best candidate (as compared to identification or
semantic classification tasks) for meeting the exhaustiveness
criterion. In contrast, a measure of awareness based on
Subliminal Semantic Priming in Speech
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awareness of non-discriminated stimuli (that nevertheless might be
detected). Our choice of a semantic classification tasks (lexical
decision) following Kouider and Dupoux [18] appears however to
be the best within a semantic priming paradigm. Obviously, when
trying to show unconscious semantic priming, one needs to control
the awareness of the semantic meaning of the stimuli, not the
purely physical awareness of the stimulus presence, that may be
reached without awareness of the stimulus semantic meaning.
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